

BEHIND THE SCENES OF CANADIAN WAR HISTORY.

William Charles Henry Wood

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BEHIND THE SCENES
OF
CANADIAN WAR HISTORY

THE J. CLARENCE WEBSTER LECTURES FOR
1925-26

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM WOOD

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Through the generosity of John Clarence Webster, LL.D., M.D., F.R.C.S., of the class of '82, a fund was provided for a lectureship in Canadian History for five years beginning with 1923-24. The second lectures on the Foundation were given in the Eurhetorian Hall on November, 25, 26 and 27, 1925, by Colonel William Wood.

The Eurhetorian Society has decided to publish the lectures in this special number of the Argosy in order to give a larger audience the privilege of enjoying them.

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PREFACE

BEFORE discussing such a long and very complex subject as Canadian War History (from the proverbial earliest times down to the present day) we might begin by taking a panoramic view of its consecutive parts.

There are five main periods, all of which naturally correspond with the evolution of Canadian history at large. The first period is, of course, that of New France, which began with Jacques Cartier's tiny fort at Quebec in 1535 and ended with the surrender of the French forces at Montreal in 1760. This we can only call the French period. The second period might, for the sake of convenience, be called the American Period, because, misnomer as this may be in many ways, it does serve better than any other to describe the half-century that elapsed between the Cession of 1763 and the close of the war of 1812. The third period might be not inappropriately called the Canadian Period, because it covers the half-century of internal troubles, between the Rebellion of 1837 and the North-West Campaign of 1885. The fourth period may be called the Imperial, because the Boer War was the first in which a Canadian contingent went overseas to what is now another part of the Empire. The fifth period may well be called the Universal Period, as the war which began in 1914 has itself been justly called the Great World War, because in this war Canadian contingents for the first time fought beyond the boundaries of the Empire, and because Canada thereafter won her own acknowledged place (both as an autonomous Dominion within the Empire and as an individual voting entity among all the British and foreign self-governing units of the world) at the councils of that League of Nations which hopes to become the universal court of appeal for all affairs of international concern.

Having now glanced at our five great periods, let us look at their own consecutive parts, and then view the panorama as a whole before going into details. Though this may seem a little pretentious as a preface to a digest which can be read within an hour, it may also prove useful for the very reason that the digest is so short, because it will serve to show at a glance how to correlate the history of Canadian wars with the history of all other forms of Canadian life from first to last.

BEHIND THE SCENES OF CANADIAN WAR HISTORY

1. THE FRENCH PERIOD (1535-1760)

1. Jacques Cartier (1535).
2. Champlain and the Iroquois (1609).
3. The First Invasion—the Kirkes take Quebec (1628-32).
4. French and English in Acadia (1613-1713).
5. French and Iroquois (1632-1713).
6. New England and New France (1690).
7. French and English (1690-1697).
8. The First British Invasion (1711—Sir Hovenden Walker).
9. The Second British Invasion (1745—Louisbourg).
10. The Third British Invasion:
 1753. Washington in the Ohio Valley.
 1754. Washington surrenders at Fort Necessity.
 1755. Braddock's fourfold campaign:—
 - (1) Braddock's defeat on the way to Fort Duquesne;
 - (2) Shirley's advance against Fort Niagara halts at Oswego;
 - (3) Johnson wins at Lake George, but fails to reach the strategic positions of Ticonderoga and Crown Point;
 - (4) The Acadian Expulsion.
 1756. Montcalm wins the strategic point of Oswego.
 1757. Montcalm takes Fort William Henry.
 1758. The British win on the flanks—at Louisbourg and Fort Duquesne, but fail in the centre—at Ticonderoga.
 1759. The British take Quebec and Fort Niagara, but fail to complete the campaign at the centre by an advance from Lake Champlain.

1760. The British close in from both flanks and the front, and New France surrenders at Montreal.

II. THE AMERICAN PERIOD (1763-1814)

1. "The Conspiracy of Pontiac" (1763-64).
2. The American Invasion of 1775-76.
3. The War of 1812.

III. THE CANADIAN PERIOD (1837-1885)

1. The Canadian Rebellion of 1837-38.
2. The Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870.
3. The Red River Expedition (1870).
4. The North-West Rebellion of 1885.

(Note. The raising of the 100th Royal Canadians as a regimental unit of the Imperial Army in 1858, the private enlistment of Papal Zouaves in 1870, and the employment of Canadian Voyageurs on the Nile in 1884, do not form any integral part of Canadian war history.)

IV. THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (1899-1902)

1. The South African War (1899-1902).

V. THE UNIVERSAL PERIOD (1914-19)

If such a list as the above is not in itself too long for such a simple digest of Canadian war history, I should like to add three short notes on three very important points which deserve special attention as vital factors in the whole complex problem, though each and all, of course, receive full consideration in every expert history of every Canadian or of any other war. First comes the vexed question of Imperial and Colonial forces, expenditures, and command. Next comes the frequently misunderstood question of numbers—of numbers engaged, of numbers under arms, of numbers in proportion to population, and of the relative numbers supplied by different elements in the population. Finally, transportation, always of vital importance, is of quite peculiar importance both to the Empire and to Canada.

I. IMPERIALS AND CANADIANS

Up to Confederation there was not even the semblance of any kind of Canadian army. There had always been some kind of Canadian militia. But without Imperial leadership, organization, forces, and finances, it was all parts and no whole. The fact that the *Troupes de la Marine* were local regulars under the French regime, and that Canadians of both races were permanently embodied, and became practically regulars for the time being, in the War of 1812, makes no essential difference. There was no Canadian nucleus from which an army could be made out of Canadian resources alone. There were no higher units, no auxiliary services on an adequate scale, and, above all, no staff. Under both regimes all Canadian forces had merely been local and strictly subordinate additions to the French or British regulars. Confederation recognized Canada's responsibility for an individual part of her own defence. The Imperial garrisons were gradually withdrawn, so gradually that they did not leave the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards for more than thirty years. In the meantime Canada began her own Permanent Force; but only by isolated bits; for there was nothing at all like the nucleus of an army till the present century. The North West Rebellion of 1885 was the first campaign fought by Canadians alone; but they were commanded by a general of the Imperial Army. The South African Contingents were Canadian all through. But they formed no higher units and were on Imperial charge. The Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great World War was the first real Canadian army, that is to say, the first entirely on Canadian charge, the first entirely under Canadian control, and the first to have all-Canadian higher units—brigades, divisions, and one complete army corps—under Canadian command. Even so, it took three years of actual war before the Corps command was given to a Canadian. Thus it was not till 1917, just fifty years after Confederation, that any Canadian army became all-Canadian all through.

That Canada took fifty years to produce a thoroughly Canadian army is, all things considered, not to be wondered at. After having been so greatly dependent on the Imperial forces for a whole century, it is rather to her credit that she became so self-dependent in another half-century. But, on the other hand, this self-dependence (or should we not say self-reliance?) was, and still is, true only in a military way. Throughout the whole century and a half, all through the Great World War, as through all previous wars, she was, as she is now, far more dependent on sea-power than on land-power; and naval sea-power was exclusively Imperial up to the Great World War, overwhelmingly Imperial all through it, and practically the same ever since. (I say "naval" sea-power advisedly, because the mercantile side is quite as important, though in a very dependent way under the stress of war.) Air-power first became a factor in the general problem during the Great World War. It is an ever-increasing factor; and both civil and combatant aviation are naturally of great importance to a country of such vast distances as Canada. But any discussion of the future of Canadian air-power lies beyond our scope at present.

Before leaving the very complex question of Imperial and Canadian forces throughout our long war history I should like to suggest that this whole subject well deserves exhaustive treatment in a special monograph, which should, of course, be based entirely on the complete original evidence and be quite free from any bias in favour of either kind of force. Both kinds will probably be found to emerge from the most searching ordeal with enhanced reputations, thus contributing to a better understanding all round. There have always been certain misunderstandings, with the consequent resentments, between colonies and mother countries all the world over. There were between the French and French-Canadians as well as between home-grown Britons and the "native-born" in the oversea colonies which are now Dominions. The prestige of the old countries and the sensitiveness of the new ones have often caused trouble in war as well as peace. But quite im-

partial history will go far to make for better understanding, better feeling, and closer sympathy on both sides.

The local Canadian efforts in resisting the American invasions of 1775 and 1812, in settling the internal troubles of what we have called the Canadian Period, and in sending the C. E. F. to the front during the Great World War were such as, under all circumstances, Canada may well be proud of and the Empire may well be grateful for. On the other hand, the Imperial forces that so long garrisoned Canada in peace and war, the great sums spent by the Mother-Country, Britain, on Canadian defence, and all the Imperial forces on Imperial pay which still guarantee Canadian security all round the world—these forces and this money likewise deserve grateful recognition from every one concerned. The Imperial taxpayer alone met the costs of military works in Canada to an amount exceeding a hundred million pounds; and this was nothing like a quarter of what he paid for fleets and garrisons allotted to Canadian defence during the century between the Conquest and Confederation. Moreover, to get any fair idea of what the Mother Country paid for Canadian defence we must multiply not only by five, to convert the pounds into dollars, but again by five, to make sums spent at an average time-distance of a century equivalent to their market value in post-war Canada today.

What a magnificent monograph could be written from the vast mass of original evidence about local and Imperial forces (both naval and military) in Canada! This field should now be ripe for the harvest. There is an immense mass of documentation in the Public Archives at Ottawa; and much more still unworked in England. Will no Canadian historian undertake this illuminating work? As a mere suggestion I should think one volume of text and another of substantiating documents would suffice, and that the title might run thus:—Canadian Defence: Imperial and Local: 1763-1867.

2. NUMBERS

I stress numbers for two reasons. First, because “noth-

ing lies like statistics" when one's passions or prejudices are allowed to run loose among the respective numbers of one's own and the enemy's forces. This form of perversion is bad in itself, and of course quite fatal to impartial history. But unfortunately there is another kind of perversion against which even the best historians (especially when they have no expert knowledge of war) must always carefully guard. In the American Civil War much confusion arose from the fact that while the Northern commanders usually reported the numbers "on rations" (which included all non-combatant services, such as commissariat, transport, railway engineers, and medical corps) the Southern commanders frequently confined their totals to actual combatants in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Again, in the Great World War it was often customary to compare the Allies and the enemy by giving the respective number of divisions on each side; though sometimes a division might be so depleted as not nearly to equal a full-strength brigade, while it might occasionally be reinforced to over its complete establishment. Once more, numbers actually engaged, and for how long, numbers present on the scene of action but not engaged, and numbers in reserve, or even within the theatre of operations, should all be carefully discriminated. The second point concerning numbers is that Canadian war history shows, by its mere tale of ever-increasing numbers, the way in which the complexities of warfare have also increased. At first each single man was a "unit" worth counting. Champlain won his first fight against the Iroquois with only two other Frenchmen. Three hundred years later, in the Great World War, the unit of reckoning was a division of well over twenty thousand men.

3. TRANSPORTATION

Canada is still "fighting geography", inasmuch as she is still, for the most part, an ever-changing strip of country three thousand miles long by one hundred wide. She has always been a land of waterways. Her landways opened slowly. Her airways will develop. For the study of her war history

her peculiar configuration must always be remembered, and, above all, the influence of sea-power on everything that ever happened, either afloat or ashore. When Jacques Cartier built his tiny fort at Quebec long voyages were still mostly reckoned by months; for the art of tacking was practically unknown. By the time of Champlain the reckoning had been reduced to weeks; for vessels now tacked to windward with sails trimmed fore and aft. Steam reduced the reckoning to days. Aircraft has reduced it to hours. Our war history has nothing to do with non-tacking ships or with any other aircraft than those at the front in the Great World War. But it has a very great deal to do with sail and steam afloat and with road and rail ashore; and these means of transportation must always be carefully examined in whatever cases they were used. Paddle, oar, and trail, of course need remembering too. All kinds of transportation were used at different times; and a good deal of overlapping occurred. For instance, there was some steamer transport in the war of 1812, while the Red River Expedition of 1870 depended almost entirely on canoes and small craft moved by sails and oars alone.

I. THE FRENCH PERIOD (1535-1760)

1. Jacques Cartier (1535)—Jacques Cartier's voyage up the St. Lawrence gave France her title to Canada for the next two hundred and twenty-five years. The little fort which Cartier's men built near Quebec may be taken as the first act in the war history of Canada; for though there was no fighting the mere existence of a French fort at Quebec, like that of the big Indian fort Jacques Cartier found at Montreal, was a precautionary measure of defence. And here we might remember that Quebec is the only place in Canada which has been fortified in five successive centuries—by Jacques Cartier in the sixteenth; by Champlain and Frontenac in the seventeenth; by various hands, both French and British, in the eighteenth; again by the British Imperials in the nineteenth, when they built the present walls of Quebec and the three big forts at Levis; and finally, in the twentieth, by the Canadians,

who built the modern forts which were inspected by the first commander of the British Army in the Great World War, then (1910) Field Marshal Sir John French.

2. CHAMPLAIN AND THE IROQUOIS (1609)

Having joined an Algonquin war party Champlain met the Iroquois near Ticonderoga.—His own words are:—“When I was within twenty paces the enemy, halting, gazed at me, as I also gazed at them. When I saw them move to shoot I drew a bead on one of the three chiefs. I had loaded with four bullets and hit three men at the first discharge, killing two on the spot. When our Indians saw this they roared so loudly that you could not have heard it thunder. Then arrows flew like hail on both sides. But when my two companions fired from the woods, the Iroquois, seeing their chiefs killed, turned tail and fled.” Thus began the French and Iroquois conflicts which went on intermittently for the next hundred and fifty years.

3. THE FIRST INVASION—THE KIRKES TAKE QUEBEC (1628-32)

In 1628 was fought the first naval action on Canadian inland waters, when the Kirkes took the four armed ships and eighteen transports coming out to the relief of half-starved Quebec. The French commander, Claude de Roquemont, fought gallantly enough; but the English were much the stronger in purely naval armament. This fight, off the Saguenay, sealed the fate of Quebec, which had no means whatever of resisting the Kirkes when they sailed up next year. In 1632 Quebec was restored to France.

4. FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN ACADIA (1613-1713)

For a whole century Acadia was the intermittent battleground of French and English, from when Argall destroyed St. Sauveur and Port Royal down to the Treaty of Utrecht, which gave Acadia to the British. The English colonists, like their kindred in the Mother Country, had superior sea-power. The French and Acadians struck back, as a rule, by

means of raids along with their Indian allies. Except for its illustration of the influence of sea-power (albeit on a microscopic scale in the local waters concerned) the unhappy story of Acadia is not of major importance in Canadian war history. Whoever had superior sea-power, in addition to other necessary resources, was bound to win an oversea possession like Canada; and whoever conquered Canada was bound to hold Acadia as well. The fact that Louisbourg remained French till 1758 did not affect the inevitable end.

5. FRENCH AND IROQUOIS (1632-1713)

Champlain had already taken sides against the Iroquois, when he joined the Algonquin war party in 1609. But, even without this, the clash with the French was inevitable; for the Iroquois were determined to hold the strategic points along the line of the fur trade, from the Hudson westward to the Lakes, and the French, with their Indian allies, were equally determined to tap the same great reservoir. In the 1640's the French missions in what was then Huronia, south-east of Georgian Bay, were simply blotted out. In the 1650's the Iroquois threatened the very life of New France. In 1660 Dollard stopped their advance on Montreal at the Long Sault Rapids, Canada's Thermopylae. Then, in 1665, with the arrival of French regulars, the tide turned. Quebec was safe. But the Massacre of Lachine in 1689 showed that the neighbourhood of even Montreal was not safe. Three years later Madeleine de Verchères held her own with a handful of men and boys till rescue came. The Soldier Settlements were forming a strong bulwark against raiders; and Frontenac's counter-raids kept the Iroquois still more in check. From this time on the most serious thing about the Iroquois was the fact that they were the allies of the English Colonies. At the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, a special clause provided that the French should not molest such Iroquois as were under the protection of the British.

6. NEW ENGLAND AND NEW FRANCE (1690)

In 1666, having missed their way on a punitive expedi-

tion against the Iroquois in the Hudson Valley, the French first met the inland English. Both were surprised, especially the French, who had expected Dutch, if anyone. Their countries were at peace; so they parted with many compliments, but also with many forebodings. In 1689 Frontenac planned the conquest of New York by a combined attack along the Hudson and in from the sea. At the same time Pieter Schuyler, Mayor of Albany, proposed what he called "The Glorious Enterprize" of conquering New France by forming an alliance with the Iroquois, by marching an inland force on Montreal, and by sending a joint naval and military force up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. This plan, with the extensions due to the growth of settlement, was the one that both Colonials and Imperials tried again and again for the following seventy years. Frontenac could not obtain the fleet from France; so he had to limit his attack to the three devastating raids which infuriated New England and produced the counter-attacks of 1690. Phips took Port Royal without any trouble and ravaged La Hève and Cape Sable. But his joint expedition to Quebec, coupled with John Schuyler's inland advance toward Montreal, was a complete failure. Phips was slow, partly due to lack of organization and proper training, partly to the dilatory councils of war. The French had to watch both Montreal and Quebec. But as soon as the advance on Montreal was seen to be a failure the whole force was transferred to Quebec with wonderful skill and promptitude. Then, when their one chance had slipped past, the leaders of Phips's force attacked and were beaten. The New Englanders were made of sterling stuff. But discipline, training, organization, and skilled leadership, all were lacking.

7. FRENCH AND ENGLISH (1690-1697)

France greatly exceeded England in population and military strength; and in 1690 the French fleet defeated the Dutch and English off Beachy Head. Frontenac and his exceedingly able naval coadjutor, Iberville, perfectly understood what French strategy in North America ought to be; and how, if

sufficient forces could only be obtained, the French could beat the English by commanding the three great gulfs of Hudson Bay, St. Lawrence, and Mexico, the four great rivers of St. Lawrence, Hudson, Ohio, and Mississippi, and the whole area of the five Great Lakes. How absurd, at first sight, all this seems now. But, with France the greatest Power in the world, with a French fleet victorious at Beachy Head, and with Frontenac victorious at Quebec, much might have happened. Moreover, Iberville later on did command the three great gulfs. He drove the English out of Newfoundland and Hudson Bay; and he commanded the Gulf of Mexico because no English challenged there. But New France never had forces to follow up her victorious vanguards. Her population was hopelessly small compared with that of the English colonies. And the balance of sea-power soon turned against her mother country—and decisively so. Frontenac's plans and Iberville's campaign will, however, well repay attentive study; for they both were excellent all through.

8. THE FIRST BRITISH INVASION (1711) SIR HOVENDEN WALKER

Walker's fleet and Jack Hill's army were so overwhelmingly strong that Quebec must have fallen and New France have surrendered if the pig-headed Admiral had not run some transports on the rocks, and he and the asinine General had not then decided to turn tail.

9. THE SECOND BRITISH INVASION: (LOUISBOURG: 1745)

This was another joint naval and military expedition; but the small squadron belonged to the Royal Navy, while all the troops and all the transports were American, mostly from Massachusetts. Commodore Warren and General Pepperrell were both first-rate leaders. Their forces were much greater than Du Chambon's garrison; and so, after a siege of nearly forty days, Louisbourg surrendered. The irregularity of the Colonials has often been paraded; and there was a good deal of comedy about this very eccentric campaign. But there

also was great enthusiasm, great endurance, and great adaptability to the peculiar nature of the siege.

10. THE THIRD (AND FINAL) BRITISH INVASION: 1753-60 1753—WASHINGTON IN THE OHIO VALLEY

Both French and British laid claims to the same parts of the Ohio valley. The British had prospective settlers; but the French had none. Consequently the inevitable rivalry ensued here, as it always has where different peoples with different densities of population are trying to expand their spheres of influence within the same area. The French officers whom Washington met, when he was laying claim to settlers' ground on behalf of the Ohio company, were most polite; but, over the wine, "they told me, that it was their absolute design to take possession of the Ohio, and by G— they would do it."

1754—WASHINGTON SURRENDERS AT FORT NECESSITY

The Ohio Company was building a fort at the Forks of the Ohio (where Pittsburg stands now) when the French took it, advanced against Washington's own force, and compelled him to surrender.

1755—BRADDOCK'S FOURFOLD CAMPAIGN

The practical assertion of French claims revived the animosity aroused by the long French-and-Indian raiding warfare against the British colonial frontier; and the Albany Convention of 1754 tried, not too successfully, to combine all the Colonies against New France, so that suitable contingents might take the field under the leadership of Braddock's Imperial troops. Four objectives were to be taken during the same campaign. Braddock was to secure the Ohio Valley by taking Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg), Shirley was to secure the important strategic point of Fort Niagara, and the line of Lake Champlain was to be secured for a final invasion by taking Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The fourth objective was the expulsion of the Acadians, so as to free that part of the frontier from all further apprehension. The whole campaign

was meant to secure a half-way foothold for the final conquest. But not one of the three strategic points was even reached, much less taken. Braddock's defeat occurred before he came to Fort Duquesne. Shirley never got beyond Oswego. And though Johnson won the battle of Lake George he never reached Ticonderoga or Crown Point. The only success was the Acadian Expulsion, which then, as now, was the subject of acrimonious dispute. Of all the parties involved, on either the French or British side, the Imperial Government comes out by far the best—the most humane and most enlightened of them all. The final appeal is, of course, to the original evidence *in toto*, and not to the garbled versions used by partisans of both contending races.

1756-9—MONTCALM

The last five campaigns for the conquest of New France have been described *ad nauseam*, but rarely by writers who viewed the whole complex subject from the combined civil, naval, and military points of view, and who carefully examined the whole mass of original evidence on both sides with a strictly impartial eye. It was commonly said at the time, and is said down to the present day by those who simply copy from each other, that New France showed a united front against the divided British. The British were certainly too much divided. The thirteen Colonies were proverbially disunited for purposes of war. There often was a lack of proper co-ordination between the naval and military forces as well as between Imperials and Colonials. Yet, as the war went on, union increased; and the final campaigns of 1759 and 1760 were, generally speaking, well combined by both land and sea.

But there had always been disunion on the French side, and never had disunion been worse than in the time of the great and unfortunate Montcalm. To begin with, the government of New France was that of an autocracy without a local autocrat. The theory that Canada was simply a Royal Province of France herself utterly broke down in practice, because the Crown was not, and could not be, the same unifying

force in Canada which it was (or at least could be made) in France. In order that it should have no local autocratic rivals, the Crown sent Intendants as administrative checks into the Provinces. But when, as in Canada, the Province was three thousand miles away, and intercommunications took months and months, then the Intendant, Governor, and Commander of the troops checkmated each other with their overlapping functions and often made confusion of the whole. Now, when Montcalm came out, this confusion was worse confounded than it had ever been before. Vaudreuil, the Governor, was a fool. Bigot, the Intendant, was a knave, and by far the worst Intendant New France had ever known. Vaudreuil had tried to prevent the home government from sending out any general from France, as he wished to hold the command himself. He would have been jealous of any French general; but he was especially jealous of Montcalm, whose vast superiority as a commander was patent to all. The King's orders were that Vaudreuil should "defer" to Montcalm in military matters. Yet he was, in a sense, the commander-in-chief himself, and could, and did, interfere at every turn. Moreover, he had that little—that very little—knowledge which is such a dangerous thing in great affairs. He had been captain of a company of French-Canadian regulars, which was the highest command for which he was fit. He was a French-Canadian born, and disliked most of the French of France; and when he could set the two kinds by the ears he generally did. He was, however, very friendly with the villainous Intendant, Bigot, who, though a Frenchman, flattered him in order to get the use of all the Governor's administrative powers for his own nefarious ends. Under Vaudreuil and Bigot and Bigot's gang of thieves New France was fast perishing of its own governmental rottenness. French sea-power was overmatched by British. So nothing but the local military forces stood between the wrecked colony and a British conquest.

Yet what was the military situation from the inside? All parts and no whole. Montcalm technically commanded only

the *Troupes de la Terre*, that is, the French regulars from France—what we would call Imperials. These were exceedingly good; and their Canadian record is one of which any army in the world might well be proud. Next came the *Troupes de la Marine* (so called because Colonial regulars were under the Department of Marine in France). These were mostly French-Canadians by birth or settlement and marriage; and Vaudreuil lost no chance of keeping them at loggerheads with the French troops from France. Next came the Canadian Militia, which theoretically consisted of every man who could stand on two legs and pull a trigger. Then came the seamen, whether naval or mercantile, who were ineffectually few at all times for defence and transportation in face of the overwhelming sea-power of the British. Finally came the Indians, under their own chiefs: a most unstable force at any time, and made all the more so by the ruthless way in which they were cheated by the Bigot gang. They were supposed to revere Vaudreuil as their great father in peace and head chief in war. But all the real fighting men revered Montcalm instead.

The French-Canadian regulars and militiamen were constitutionally under Vaudreuil, who, as we have just seen, resented being told to "defer" to Montcalm's opinions on military matters. The militia could not all be under arms together, especially at seed time or harvest—the very times campaigns were opening or coming to a climax. Moreover, many were needed for commissariat and transport, which, to increase the overlapping confusion, were under Bigot, who also was, to all intents and purposes, head army contractor as well. The militia were bound to serve without pay when in the ranks. So Bigot would ask them whether they wanted to get shot for nothing or serve him in safety for pay. "What a country," wrote the despairing Montcalm, "where rogues grow rich and honest men are ruined!"

And yet, despite all disadvantages, Montcalm is the only man who has ever beaten British forces four times running. He beat them (whether Colonials or Imperials or both) at

Oswego in 1756, at Fort William Henry in 1757, at Ticonderoga in 1758, and at Montmorency in 1759. Thwarted, cheated, stabbed in the back by men on his own side, and by the very men who should have helped him most, with five parts and no whole among the fluctuating forces under his interfered-with command, with a thoroughly rotten civil government eating out the heart of the country, and without the absolutely indispensable help of an efficient sea-power, he proved himself the victor on four fields in four successive campaigns.

This, unfortunately, is not the place to discuss his strategy and tactics, his magnificent leadership, and his glorious end. But it is the place to add that he was a better general than Wolfe, that he foresaw every move Wolfe made, up to the very last, and that his much criticized action in the battle of the Plains was also, under the then existing circumstances, not only *sans peur* but *sans reproche* from the professional point of view. I ask any student of war history to follow Montcalm's career from the full original evidence on both sides, and see for himself.

THE BRITISH SIDE: 1756-8

Thrown back upon the defensive in 1756-7, the British resumed a half-effective offensive in 1758, when, though they failed against the centre, at Ticonderoga, they succeeded on the flanks of New France, at Louisbourg in the east, Fort Duquesne and Fort Frontenac in the west.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1759

New France had now shrunk so much that its inner flank was at Fort Niagara, and its outer at Quebec, while its centre was at Montreal. But, for obvious reasons, Quebec was the stronghold on which all depended; for it was the one remaining outlet to the sea; and sea-power, then as always, was of supreme importance. When Fort Niagara fell the last French link with the Lakes and with Louisiana was lost for ever. When Quebec fell the last effective link with European sea-power was also lost. But Wolfe's failure to capture the

French army there, and Amherst's failure to reach Montreal, combined to make it necessary to fight one more campaign next year. Amherst's failure was chiefly due to the fact that the French held what might be called (in spite of its microscopic scale) "the command of the sea" on Lake Champlain till the season was too late for an advance on Montreal. Seapower, as illustrated by the inland waterways of this whole theatre of war, is well worth a special study of its own. To begin with, it was (without exaggeration, and in the most literal meaning of the words) easier to move a hundred tons of transport by water than a single ton by land in those days—far easier. The army that lost the command of inland waterways, when compared with one which had gained it, was no better than a legless horse or a wingless bird.

WOLFE IN THE QUEBEC CAMPAIGN OF 1759

In most senses of the term Wolfe was a hero, if ever there was one: brave to a fault, devoted to his profession, a hard student of its very exacting requirements, full of human sympathy, yet a good disciplinarian, and in many ways an ideal leader born and bred. But in war the great objective always is the enemy's fighting force, not any mere position, however important in itself, and Montcalm's army was much more important than Quebec. Wolfe had the enormous advantage of commanding what really was nothing else than a comparatively small, but very efficient, landing party from a simply overwhelming fleet. Montcalm had only one long and very precarious line of communication for supplies, reinforcements, or retreat. The overpowering British fleet cut him off from the sea and the south. There was nothing to subsist an army to the north. So his one line of all communications lay to the west; very precarious indeed for many miles up the St. Lawrence, and very inefficient along the one bad road to Montreal. If, therefore, Wolfe could get his small, but quite sufficient, army of well trained regulars across the only road still open to Montcalm, while a squadron of Saunders's big fleet held the river near by, then Montcalm would be obliged to

fight, starve, or surrender; and fighting meant a certain British victory, because Wolfe's regulars outnumbered Montcalm's more than two to one. To cut off Montcalm in this way meant landing some twenty miles west of Quebec, whence only one road led on to Montreal. Nearer Quebec there was another road, down in the Valley of the St. Charles, which joined the upper road about twenty miles west; and it was by this lower road that the French escaped after the battle of the Plains, a thing they could not have done if Wolfe's army had been at, or west of, the point where this lower road joined the only one that ran to Montreal.

Wolfe's plan, and the execution of it, for the world-famous battle of the Plains, were as near perfection as anything can be. But the point is that this (in itself most admirable) action resulted only in the capture of Quebec, not in the capture of the whole French army. The escape of the French entailed another campaign next year.

Lest this criticism of such a "standard" victory should perhaps be thought presumptuous here, I might mention that I have often had the honour of escorting British and foreign soldiers and sailors over the Quebec battlefields, and I have never found one who thought Wolfe's strategy was right, though all agreed that the second-best plan was carried out almost to perfection. Excluding the opinions of foreigners and sailors, lest there might be the slightest suspicion of even unconscious bias against Wolfe, I may mention three well-known British commanders-in-chief—Field Marshals Lords Wolseley, Roberts, and French. Lords Roberts and French personally examined the whole scene of action, with all necessary data at their command. Lord Wolseley personally knew Quebec and Canada exceedingly well, as he was a staff officer here for several years. His written opinion in a private letter is this:—"Wolfe was a first-rate commanding officer of a battalion; but, in the only campaign he ever conducted, he did not, according to my views of men who have conducted campaigns, display any originality or any great genius for war."

II. THE AMERICAN PERIOD 1763-1814

1. PONTIAC'S WAR: 1763-4

The French drew the colour line far less strictly than the English-speaking peoples did, and their much smaller numbers meant far less dispossession of red men's lands by whites. For these and other reasons most Indians sided with the French and deeply resented the arrival of Major Rogers' expedition to take possession of Detroit, Michillimackinac, etc., after the surrender of 1760. Three years later the inevitable clash came when Pontiac made the last great Indian effort to safeguard for the red men the lands now threatened by the pacific or forcible penetration of the whites. The usual kind of warfare between savage and civilized followed. But Pontiac's power of combining several different tribes into the semblance of a united army raised him to the heights of Indian statesmanship, while the stubbornness of many Indians in action against whites on several occasions was not unworthy of their desperate patriotism against the eventual destruction of their Indian forms of life. On the other hand, while the British American Colonies (of which Canada then was one, despite her difference in constitution) did far less than their share of the fighting, the British regulars not only did most but did it extremely well. "We shall know better next time," said the dying Braddock. The successor who not only knew better but did best was Henry Bouquet, colonel of the 60th Royal Americans (now the King's Royal Rifle Corps) whose victory at Bushy Run is a perfect model of what such a battle should be. The scenes of action were all in what is now the United States. But the Indian attack on Detroit and the general Indian effort to stop the westward movement of the whites, together with the fact that all south-west Ontario was at least under the shadow of the war cloud, justify the inclusion of Pontiac's War in this "American" Period of Canadian war history.

2. THE REVOLUTIONARY INVASION OF 1775

From the naval and military point of view nothing could

be more foolish than this invasion. Yet Washington was a great and most cool-headed leader of the new army raised by the Thirteen Colonies, which had not yet declared their Independence; while Montgomery and Arnold were good soldiers, Arnold being perhaps the best natural leader on either side throughout the whole war of Independence. The explanation is that this was a political move based on false and most misleading information. The Thirteen Colonies wished to make Canada the Fourteenth. They and their leaders were completely misinformed by local sympathizers in Canada. And so the invaders went to their doom. Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec is a classic of determination under enormous difficulties. Montgomery's advance along the old line of invasion to Montreal was well conducted under great difficulties of another kind. And the so-called "siege" of Quebec was well done, considering the hopelessly inadequate forces engaged. The famous assault of December 31, 1775, was the crowning disaster, from the American point of view; and the way in which it was made certainly seems the crowning mistake of the whole mistaken campaign. But again, we must remember that politics dictated the tactics employed. Montgomery and Arnold (if indeed they would have attempted any assault) would never have tried to take the fortified upper town of Quebec by rushing the barricades of the lower town first, unless they had been persuaded by the politicians that, once the action had begun, the Revolutionists in Quebec itself would throw the gates open to their deliverers.

3. THE WAR OF 1812

As in the American Revolution, so here, each combatant fought with one arm tied. As the Loyalists hampered the Revolutionists and the Opposition hampered the King's Party, so New England's semi-neutrality hampered the American War Party of 1812 and the climax of the Napoleonic wars hampered the Home Government, which did its best to avert war altogether. Politics again usurped military control of the invasion; for the Americans were still obsessed by the belief

that Canada was waiting to be "freed" by their arms. They had one of the very worst civilian war ministers with whom any country has ever been cursed (and that is saying a very great deal). This William Eustis declared that "We can take Canada without soldiers. We have only to send officers into the Provinces, and the people, disaffected towards their own government, will rally round our standard." The disjointed invasions of 1812 and 1813 are beneath contempt from the military point of view. But by 1814 the stress of war had forced some really good leaders to the front, and turned the best men of what had been a mere armed mob into the makings of a very good army.

The war of course turned greatly on sea-power, and on sea-power exerted over the inland waterways as well as over the Atlantic. There was no great fleet action, simply because the Americans had no great fleet. But there were plenty of ship duels, most of which were won by the Americans, because their ships, crews, and armament were nearly all superior to those of the corresponding British vessels that engaged them. The British were hard pressed for able seamen after nearly twenty years of war, coupled with the necessity of keeping up the largest merchant navy in the world. The Americans, on the other hand, were fresh, and at their very prime as seamen of an expanding foreign and domestic trade. Moreover, as the saying was, they offered "dollars for shillings", and so had attracted some excellent outsiders. But their superiority in ships, armament, and gunnery was much greater still; and this was due to the inexcusable negligence of the British. The ship duels did not touch Canada very intimately, except in regard to her natural resentment at an enemy's success and to a certain interference with her seaborne trade. She naturally rejoiced when the perfectly commanded, perfectly manned, armed, and handled *Shannon* beat the *Chesapeake* and brought her into Halifax. But, deeply engaged in her own share of the war along her open frontier, she did not take so much note of a far more significant effect of proper British sea-power, when, after the middle of 1813, the whole coast

of the United States gradually became so thoroughly blockaded that the Stars and Stripes virtually disappeared from the sea.

The element of sea-power that Canada naturally observed more closely was the one exerted on the inland waters. On Lake Ontario the British and Americans fought and manoeuvred without any definite triumph or defeat. But the American victory on Lake Erie laid Western Ontario open to a consequent military invasion, with an American victory on the Thames, and the resultant domination of that whole area by the Americans for the remainder of the war. At Lake Erie the inferior British forces fought exceedingly well; and though Procter did not handle his little army on the Thames nearly so well as Barclay handled his own flotilla on the Lake, yet there was no disgrace,

But on the other flank, on Lake Champlain, the British Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, Sir George Prevost, utterly disgraced himself both by land and sea. Both sides recognized that he had an overwhelming force of veteran British soldiers, with whom, had he acted promptly and properly, he could easily have taken Plattsburg, and then turned his own (and any serviceable American) guns on the little American flotilla at anchor in the bay. Macdonough's American flotilla was mostly armed with short-range carronades. Downie's British flotilla was mostly armed with long-range cannon. The vital difference therefore was that if Macdonough had to leave the bay for the open lake he would be destroyed by Downie, who "had the range of him" at long distances; but that if Macdonough remained at anchor and Downie had to close on him, then Macdonough's carronades, far more deadly than cannons at short ranges, would just as surely destroy Downie. (The difference was that a carronade fired masses of big bullets, as if from a gigantic shot-gun, while a long cannon fired a single ball, or sometimes two. Up to a couple of hundred yards the deluging carronades naturally inflicted far more damage than the one-or-two-shot cannons, while at much longer ranges the cannons had it all their own

way, because the carronades simply could not reach the enemy at all.)

Prevost wantonly reversed the proper order of attack by basely goading Downie into premature action at close quarters in the bay. Downie had been exerting himself to the very uttermost, with the loyal assistance of every naval rating under his command. But, short of everything, he could not complete preparations in the time Prevost gave him—and Prevost must have known this. Yet Prevost (far his senior and in a different service) began to goad him most disgracefully. Downie set sail, though reporting his vessels unready (and afterwards, when sailing to his doom, the carpenters were still hammering on the very eve of action in the bay). The wind flawed, failed, and veered, so as to make it impossible to come south that day. Prevost, to his eternal shame, wrote saying he would “rejoice to learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other cause.” than the change of wind reported by Downie, whom Prevost was keeping under observation by a staff officer. “No other cause”—the vile words rankled; for they implied “shyness” on the part of Downie and the Navy to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-chief, who was a soldier. “I’ll convince him that the Navy won’t be backward” said Downie to his second-in-command, Pring, according to the court-martial evidence given later on. So, at the first change of wind, Downie sailed for Plattsburg. Here, Prevost, with his overwhelming army and guns enough to drive Macdonough outside in five minutes, made no previous attack at all, but waited till Downie was forced to close and get annihilated; and then, after a contemptible display, retreated a great deal faster than he came.

The land warfare elsewhere was mostly in favour of the British. The Americans, as we have seen already, fought very well on land in 1814, when properly trained and led. But, on the whole, there is no war in the world that better exemplifies the utter worthlessness of any mass of men, however good otherwise, who are herded off to the front as a mere armed mob. In population and general resources the United

States—even excluding all its Peace Party—was ten times stronger than Canada. Canada, moreover, had the merest handful of Imperial regulars when the war began. But the blundering armed mob of Americans made a hopeless failure of everything during the first campaign; though the very same men, if properly organized, trained, officered, supplied, staffed, and commanded, would most certainly have conquered Canada with ease. Over five hundred thousand American enlistments were made during the war. Yet no battlefield ever saw ten thousand together—two per cent of the whole. More than fifty thousand died of mostly preventible diseases. Not nearly half ever got to the front. Not a quarter came into action. In the third year of the war the handful of American regulars (both naval and military) defending Washington fought four times their numbers of British, and fought very well indeed. But the comparatively few militiamen who did turn out there stampeded like cattle when the first men were hit at what was derisively called the Bladensburg Races. Then some four thousand British marched to and from Washington, quite unmolested, through an area containing 93,500 militiamen on paper, in the very heart of the War Party states. So much for armed mobs versus armies!

The British forces in Canada deserve careful study. They must be discriminated into Imperial Regulars and Canadian regulars—or at least Canadians permanently under arms throughout the war, and militiamen with varying degrees of discipline and training. The "Select Embodied Militia," for instance, were sometimes as much trained as regulars. An armed mob of Canadians, like any other armed mob, would have been useless against a real army. It is most instructive to follow up the exact degree of discipline and training enjoyed by those who did so well in action. Look, for instance, at Chateaugay. The numbers actually engaged were so few as to reduce this "battle" to a skirmish. Yet very many more were near by; and the ill-trained, unwieldy, mishandled Americans—good enough as men, though worthless as an army—were in overwhelming numbers. De Salaberry and

his brothers were officers in the Imperial Army (a fact not often mentioned in patriotic histories). His excellent French-Canadian Voltigeurs were also regulars, who had been embodied before the war began. The Fencibles supporting him were regulars too, and of ten years standing. All the Select Militia present had been under arms for eighteen months; and the only other militia present—most of whom never came under fire there—had already been embodied twice for service in the field. The idea of untrained patriots suddenly taking up arms and winning victories is all clap-trap nonsense. The real facts point all the other way.

Two very different incidents of 1812 are worth remembering, as each is most significant in its own way. The mostly French-Canadian Parliament of Lower Canada passed, at the very outset of the war, an Army Bill Act pledging the Province of Quebec to the extent of four years' revenue, and with notes bearing interest at six per cent. This Army Bill Act was not only the most important financial measure of the war but, in some ways, of the whole financial history of Canada. The Army Bills were the first paper money in the whole New World which never lost face value for a day and which were ever redeemed at par. They led the public to place such confidence in good paper money that they helped to inaugurate the banking system, which, in its turn, helped Canadian business so much in later years.

The other incident is Wellington's readiness to leave Europe (where he was relatively much more powerful than even Marshal Foch was a century later) and take command of a "side-show" in Canada, if the government thought of retrieving, in 1815, the disgrace Prevost had brought on British arms at Plattsburg in 1814. Writing to the Secretary of State of War (Earl Bathurst) from Paris, on November 4, 1814, he said:—"Private and Confidential—

I see that the Publick are very impatient about the want of success in America. It is now too late to think of going to America this year; and I believe I should not be able to go to Quebec till April. If, however, in March next

you should think it expedient that I should go there, I beg you will understand that I have no objection whatever. It will be for you to consider whether I can be most useful to you there, here, or elsewhere.

Ever yours,
my Dear Lord,
most sincerely,
WELLINGTON.

III. THE CANADIAN PERIOD: 1837-1885

The unhappy times of 1837-8 and the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870 are of more political than military importance. The Canadian Militia of the 1860's enjoyed the advantage of having their best officers attend schools of instruction such as the one managed by (the future Lord) Wolseley at La Prairie after the Trent Affair of 1861. This told on the services performed in the Raids.

The Red River Expedition of 1870 saw no fighting. But it was a most searching test of transportation over much the same sort of land and waterways as all sides had to face a century before. The Canadian Militia engaged in it deservedly won the highest appreciation of the commander (Lord Wolseley) whose little force was partly Imperial and partly Canadian.

The North West Rebellion of 1885 is very interesting as the first campaign fought entirely by Canadians on Canadian pay, and under exclusively Canadian control. The fact that the commander was an Imperial officer (General Middleton) made the less difference inasmuch as he was then commanding the Canadian Militia, and so was not brought in for the purpose of leading the campaign. Commissariat and transport were again a great problem, on the whole well solved. The actual fighting was distinguished by the usual features of wars against wholly or partly uncivilized and poorly armed peoples. The North West Mounted Police, the few Canadian regulars, and the much greater number of militiamen, all did well.

IV. THE INTER-IMPERIAL PERIOD: THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR OF 1899-1902

This was the first occasion on which Canadian contingents took part in an overseas campaign within what became a part of the British Empire. The numbers involved (eight thousand altogether) did not greatly exceed one per thousand of the Dominion's population; and the payment was mostly Imperial. There were no higher units; and the Canadians virtually became parts of Imperial brigades and divisions. The services, however, were very well performed—to Canada's lasting honour.

V. THE UNIVERSAL PERIOD: THE GREAT WORLD WAR OF 1914-18

Nothing like even the briefest sketch of this Universal Period can possibly be attempted here. Canada's part of the World War is alone so vast, so extremely complex, and so very recent that it could not be outlined in this little digest, even if it could be isolated from the other British parts of that stupendous war. But even the British parts can only be understood in relation to those of our Allies, our enemies, and the whole neutral world. So I must therefore not only confine ourselves to a very few suggestive facts but omit the most important feature of all—the actual fighting at the front—except by a necessary reference here and there. The object of this digest has been to concentrate our main attention on what the public usually knows and cares about least—the springs of action that work behind the scenes.

Five points may be considered. First, the foreshadowing of the Great World War; secondly, the Preparations for it; thirdly, the Canadian effort in it; fourthly, the merest hint of its vast Complexities; and fifthly, a suggestion as to how its History should be collected, arranged, and written.

I. FORESHADOWINGS: 1864-1914

In 1864, at the very time that the Fathers of Confederation were holding their first consultations at Quebec, the Prus-

sians and Austrians were wresting from Denmark the Schleswig Holstein duchies which afterwards made such a convenient screen for the future German Empire's "battleworthy" Kiel Canal. There was some racial justification for the war of 1864, as a good many German-speaking people were under the Danish flag. But here, as with Alsace-Lorraine, the conquerors took some non-German-speaking country too. In 1866 Austria was attacked, to make Prussia predominant in Central Europe; but she was carefully nursed back into the close alliance which helped to make the Great World War. In 1870 France was beaten. Then came the German Empire; and German military predominance all over the continent of Europe. A few years later the victorious Germans, with their rapidly expanding population, quite naturally began to look around for expansion room elsewhere. Trading posts and overseas possessions were good enough in their way; and the Germans got a fair amount of both. Between 1884 and 1890 they acquired German East, West, and South-West Africa, part of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and Heligoland. German East Africa cut into the flank of the proposed British Cape-to-Cairo Railway. But, then, why should the British alone have a trans-African line? Little Heligoland did not want to join the German Empire. But it was a Germanic island. It was a strategic point in the Bight, and very convenient as an offshore defence for the future Kiel Canal. But not many people then anticipated trouble.

In 1896 the Kruger Telegram, in which the Kaiser congratulated President Kruger on his handling of the Jameson Raid, made people see that Germany was anxious to show how far her mailed fist liked to reach. The British Special Service Squadron that cruised about immediately afterwards showed, in its turn, that British sea-power wished to keep South Africa clear of German Weltmacht. In 1897 the Germans possessed themselves of Kiao-chou. But other powers had, not much more tenderly, possessed themselves of treaty ports on China. In 1898 Germany was bitterly disappointed at the

sudden American success; for she had hoped to acquire the dying Spanish Empire overseas. The German squadron at Manilla was purposely made stronger than the American; and German aggressiveness reached such a threatening point that the senior British naval officer (Chichester) anchored between Dewey and Dietrichs, to let the latter see how both the English-speaking peoples would stand side by side if it ever came to blows. That same year Von Tirpitz first caught the public eye as the indefatigable lobbyist who manoeuvred the first big Navy Bill through the German Reichstag. Next year the Sultan of Turkey granted to the German Kaiser ("my only friend in Europe") enormous and exclusive rights over the famous BBB—the Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad railway which was to reach the Persian Gulf and have branch lines also threatening British communications with India by pointing toward the Suez Canal. Finally, in 1900, came the great challenging German Navy Bill which openly declared that Germany must henceforth have a navy strong enough to "imperil" any possible antagonist, "even the strongest." To point the moral, the Kaiser, when launching a man-of-war about the same time, declared that henceforth no international question should be settled without due deference to German intervention. The German Navy League presently exceeded a million paying members, and these perfervid advocates of sea-power persuaded the majority of Germans to follow them with all the means required for securing the great new German "place in the sun."

But why shouldn't Germans have their place in the sun, a place that is, where the emigrating parts of the very rapidly expanding German population could grow up as good Germans under the German flag? Why should the Russians, Americans, and British have so much of the white man's world, and the Germans have so little? Well, the desire was natural enough. But the trouble of it all most obviously was that other peoples had started some generations sooner. The tragedy of it was that no new German white men's countries were now to be found without a devastating war. And the

crime of it was that when the Germans fought this war they waged it (to use their own official term) "ruthlessly" enough to make themselves the outlaws of the modern world. Trouble, and tragedy, and crime: these three fated qualities drew the Germans into the world fire of their own igniting.

Germany, of course, never wanted a world war. She wanted three wars: first with France and Russia, which, with her allies, she would probably have won. Then, supreme in continental Europe, she would have fought an isolated British Empire. Had she won this war, she could have held her own, and more, against the United States when taking her place in the sun of pregnant South America. But her diplomacy was very non-Bismarckian, except in her cynical ways. France and Russia drew together; then the British under wise King Edward. In 1905 the Kaiser dramatically landed at Tangier, to show the world in general, and France in particular, that North African affairs were within the German sphere of Weltmacht influence. In 1906 the Algeciras conference showed him there were too many chances still against him. In 1907 Germany absolutely refused even to consider any reduction of armaments applying to herself, no matter what the other Powers proposed to do at this abortive discussion at The Hague. In 1908 Canada was celebrating her Tercentenary at Quebec. The French, American, and British navies had all sent ships that landed naval brigades for the review of the Canadian forces by King George V., then Prince of Wales, who was accompanied by the Vice-President of the United States and by the official representatives of France. Canadians thrilled with pride at seeing the first review at which Canadians in their thousands had ever appeared together under arms from every part of Canada. But these Canadians little heeded the "Shining Armour" speech the Kaiser made that year, when "splendiferously" (there is no other quite befitting word) taking his stand beside his Brother of Austria against all and sundry who might object to Austrian mailed fists in the Balkans. Nor did many Canadians then take very serious heed of the Kaiser's letter to Lord Tweed-

mouth, whom he wished to persuade not to increase the British navy—since the guileless Germans were only replacing old tons by new, etc., etc. In 1911, when Canada was all agog about U. S. Reciprocity, the Agadir incident provoked a crisis which nearly led to what would have become the great world war. In 1912 the Balkan fighting, the feverish German pushing of the B. B. B., and the peep behind the scenes of the Haldane mission to Berlin, all pointed toward approaching war. In 1913 the immediate striking force of the whole German army was practically doubled—as from the spring of 1914. France prepared to meet this quite unmistakable move. And British, French, and Belgians held staff conferences at which the long-foreshadowed German flank-encircling march through neutral Belgium was discussed. In 1914 came the war—and like the proverbial bolt from the blue to millions of people who either never saw the war clouds rise or else looked carelessly (or sometimes carefully) the other way.

2. PREPARATIONS: 1904-1914

The head and heart of the Empire naturally felt the menace first. But, even there, so close to Germany, the general public was not greatly roused to the impending danger. The naval, military, and civil leaders, however, knew something and suspected more. The trouble was, there and then, as everywhere and always, that certain preparations, however necessary, could not be made for lack of means, and means could not be obtained because the public was mostly intent on other things, and because all publics put off the evil day as much as possible. It is only when the fear of death exceeds the fear of the surgeon's knife that the average human being will have an operation. But some few, wise, previsionary leaders foresaw and forearmed—so far as that was possible.

In 1904, ten years before the war, the Admiralty issued a report which revolutionized the stations of the fleet, making more than three-quarters of the whole Navy instantly mobilisable within the threatened North Sea area. The price of this report was one penny. But it found few readers; and I

well remember being asked by some quite intelligent Canadians why I made so much of it in my article on Canada's relations to the Empire in the *Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada*, where I said: "Sir John Fisher's new scheme for the *Distribution and Mobilization of the Fleet* is the best and most momentous change of its kind which has been effected for a hundred years. The old scheme was mainly the work of Lord St. Vincent—interesting to Canadians as the friend of Wolfe at Quebec; and there can be no greater tribute to his essential wisdom than the mere fact that it has remained in force down to the centennial year of Trafalgar. But steam and telegraphy, the rise of the German Navy, the growth of Greater Britain, the dynamic changes in world-politics, and many minor causes, have made it obsolescent for nearly a generation past. The future guiding principles are concentration of battle fleets, world-wide connection by cruiser squadrons, and ready reserves. . . . Behind these great divisions, that really form but one mighty line of battle on the one high sea, stands the general Fleet Reserve, homogeneously grouped together in three Home ports, and carefully told off in advance as reinforcements for the six divisions already at sea, though quite ready to concentrate on any one particular point of danger."

That was the first and greatest preparation made ten years before the war. The second was the planning of the new great class of Dreadnought battleships, a class which superseded all predecessors, and which was itself superseded by the super-Dreadnoughts shortly before the war. Lord Fisher calculated that the British Dreadnoughts would inevitably be answered by German Dreadnoughts, but that the British might keep a year or two ahead in construction. He also calculated that the German Dreadnoughts would compel the Germans to enlarge the Kiel Canal, that, under normal conditions, this enlargement would take fifteen years, but that, under intensive construction, they could complete the work in ten. Everything turned out as he had forecasted; and the war began in 1914, ten years after Fisher's original plans

were made to get a start in building, to keep the Germans quiet for ten years, and to "contain" their High Seas Fleet when war did come by making Scapa Flow the main headquarters of the vast Grand Fleet.

The reason for so much insistence upon these crucial points (so little understood by the Canadian public and even most politicians at the time) is that the British Grand Fleet was the hub of the wheel of the war—the hub of the wheel of the whole world war, not only all round the Seven Seas, but on all five continents as well. For if the Grand Fleet once was beaten, then the German High Seas Fleet would have swept the surface, while the German submarines would have been ten times as dangerous as they were. The failure of the German submarine campaign of 1917 was due, first of all, to the lack of surface craft supporting it, and, secondly, to the adoption of the convoy system by those whom the submarines attacked. But if the High Seas Fleet had been victorious all the convoys in the world could not possibly have kept communications open overseas; and without those over-sea communications the war would most certainly have been lost; for the Allies would have been all parts and no whole, and their armies would have perished where they stood, for lack of reinforcements and supplies.

The Entente with France helped this North Sea concentration by relieving the British of the main naval guarding of the Mediterranean. A few years later (in 1909) there were naval debates in the Canadian Parliament; and a very small Canadian navy was eventually founded in time to take part in the war. Through no fault of its own, however, this part was so unfortunately small as not to be discussable among the major factors of the mighty problem here.

In 1910, Robert Blatchford, editor of the Socialist paper *Clarion*, wrote a very remarkable series of articles in the *Daily Mail*, using that medium simply because its circulation was the biggest in the world. He began by saying: "I write these articles because I believe that Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. I write from a sense

of duty, and from a conviction that the destruction of the British Empire would be a misfortune for Europe and a blow to civilization throughout the world. I take this course against my own interests and against the feeling of most of my political and many of my private friends." But who will say that he was not right—absolutely right? Or who, again, can deny that the veteran Lord Roberts was not right when, about the same impending time, he was urging some reasonable form of universal training for the army that would have to meet this war?

Now let us turn to Canada herself. And first let us remember Canadian difficulties: our "fight with geography"; our long, narrow strip of developed country, three thousand miles long and only one or two hundred wide; our small population—not so much larger than London's or New York's; our bi-racial and bi-lingual stock; our newer foreign immigrants; our economic struggles to live beside a neighbor more than ten times as populous and far more than twenty times richer than ourselves; and finally, the fact that this mighty war would be the first in which Canada would have to decide for herself. She had never decided before. Of course, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier rightly said, when the Empire was at war Canada was too; and no enemy whatever would ever respect Canadian neutrality, unless such neutrality suited his own purpose as an anti-British enemy. But Canada, being a completely autonomous Dominion, would have to decide entirely for herself what forces, if any, she would employ, and at her own expense. She could remain neutral, and live (as a parasite) on those who fought the Germans, or even exist (again as a parasite) under the wing of the Monroe Doctrine. But she chose the nobler part, and did her noble share.

Her preparations, considering all her difficulties, could not have been very great. But they might well have been a little greater; and far more efficient than they were. We have already alluded to the infant Navy. There was no organized Air Force. So we may concentrate entirely on the army that became the C. E. F.

The Canadian Militia, despite its long and honourable history, and the magnificent human material out of which it should have been recruited, was neither a part-time army nor even anything like the makings of one. There were no really practical higher units, even in the infantry; and the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and auxiliary services were under-proportioned, even in comparison with the under-strength infantry. Professional men, like doctors and engineers, were not rostered and classified beforehand in accordance with their abilities—an omission that caused endless trouble in the war. Or take one instance of technical preparation neglected with dire results. When General Jones tested Field Ambulances at London, Ontario, in 1912, and rightly recommended a little motorisation, and ready-made plans for more if required, the vote was refused outright.

In 1905 (the year the Kaiser landed at Tangier to test the Franco-British strength) the Militia Council made the following report:—

“The Militia Council have had to take things as they found them, and to endeavour to shape existing forces and conditions into a better organization, without introducing radical changes which would disturb vested interests and which it might not be possible to carry through. They have not had a clean sheet on which to draw out their plans and they have constantly had to compromise between what was desirable and what was attainable.”

“Efficiency and genuine economy combined can only be realized in the case of a country like Switzerland, where the patriotic spirit of the people recognizes that the first duty of a freeman is to take his share in the defence of his country.”

“This was the doctrine and practice of our forefathers, whether of French or British origin. The theory remains, but the practice has been allowed to die out. Corps have had to be raised where they had support and not at the places where they are most wanted. Local feeling has to be taken into consideration and often guides decisions. The military members of Council are well aware that their proposals are

not the best possible; but they submit that both policy and proposals must be judged in the light of the facts."

The memorandum then goes on to point out that the Canadian Parliament had already agreed to a peace strength of a hundred thousand, with the Dominion's whole available manhood as a general reserve.

In 1907 (the year Germany scouted all disarmament proposals at the Hague) Sir Percy Lake forecast Valcartier Camp in a very expert way. Five years later General Mackenzie worked out the plans in detail for multiples of ten thousand men, all the way up to a couple of hundred thousand. In 1910 a third expert, Lord French, (the first commander of the original B. E. F. in France) came out, on the invitation of the Canadian government, and made many valuable suggestions, including provision for a C. E. F., if and when required by Canada herself. Among his recommendations the most outstanding were for organization, mobilization, and a trained staff strong enough for the double work of war—half at the front, the others at the base.

In 1911 (when the Agadir incident so nearly plunged the whole world into war) there was a change of government; and Sir Frederick Borden was replaced by Sir Sam Hughes. Sir Frederick Borden, though he made many mistakes, and though (as a party politician) he sometimes had to deflect the true interests of both the Permanent and Active Militia from the best straight line toward efficiency, was yet a good war minister, if only from the one extremely important fact that he learnt pretty well the essential difference between civil control and civilian interference. This essential difference is of supreme importance. Civil control is of the very breath of freedom, and should always be maintained, even in the crisis of a life-or-death war. It has, of course, the defects of its qualities, and it does tend to complicate military matters, on occasion, far more than they ought to be. The statesman's sphere of influence is more complex than the soldier's; and the statesman has to reckon with more of the foolish, bad, and lower side of human nature, which never shows to worse ad-

vantage than when under the spell of herd-minded passions, fears, or unreasoning beliefs. But the statesman shows his highest qualities when he knows how best to guide the groping public; and equally so when he knows where civil control ends and civilian interference begins. The elder Pitt and Abraham Lincoln were two of the great war statesmen who learnt to discriminate between control and interference. But Vaudreuil, the petty-minded governor of Canada when Pitt was waging his war of conquest, and Stanton, the intermeddling war minister whom Lincoln had to keep for political reasons, were two merely-pseudo-statesmen who never discriminated between control and interference; and with these two Sir Sam Hughes must, most regrettably, be ranked, and not with Pitt and Lincoln.

The difference between civil control and civilian interference can be quite easily explained by supposing the proverbial Ship of State to be a fighting man-of-war. The people are the owners, with all an owner's rights; while their chosen government is their agent, with all an agent's delegated power. The fighting Services (as the word Services so properly implies) are simply the People's servants, though taking orders only from the government. But when the ship is getting "fit to go foreign", still more when she is out at sea, and most of all when she is fighting, then she should be handled only by her expert captain and his expert crew. Civilian interference begins the moment any inexperienced outsider usurps the captain's place; and this interference is no less disastrous when the interferer remains at home and gives the captain muddling orders than if he grabbed the wheel out of the helmsman's hands in the very middle of a storm.

For five long years, from 1911 till half-way through the Great World War, Sir Sam Hughes, though full of excessive ardour, and doubtless meaning well enough, simply personified civilian interference at its worst. The fact that he was an old militiaman, and that he promoted himself to general's rank, makes no difference. He was wholly unfitted to handle an army in either peace or war. This little digest

is not the place for detail. But the vast original evidence bristles with superabundant examples to the point.

In 1913, the year before the war, a return was presented to Parliament showing the relative expenditures on defence (of all kinds) by the different self-governing portions of the Empire. The amounts given are per head of the population as at the census of 1911:—Canada—\$1.47; South Africa—\$1.49; New Zealand—\$2.43; Australia—\$5.11; British Isles—\$7.41.

One item of Canadian expenditure deserves special attention here—the R. M. C. at Kingston. No institution justified its national existence better by its resultant effect on the war. The total number of ex-cadets on active service was 914. Of these 390 held Imperial or Indian commissions. The remaining 525 served with the C. E. F. among its 22,592 officers. But though the R. M. C. men formed only two-and-a-quarter per cent of the whole they held twenty-three per cent of the staff appointments and unit commands (from battalions or batteries up.) They thus formed ten times as high a percentage of the picked directing brains as they did of the general ruck. In other words, while they formed less than a fortieth part of the milk, they formed nearly a fourth of the cream.

Students of the American Civil War will remember that though the United States, both North and South alike, was the very last country in the world to favour professional soldiers, and more especially as compared with either militia-men or pure civilians, yet every single chief victorious commander, on either side, all through, was an expert trained West Pointer.

3. CANADA'S WAR EFFORT: 1914-19

It is always difficult to estimate any national effort in war, but particularly so in the case of Canada in the Great World War, owing to the immense complexities of the different costs—the cost in actual money (with due allowance for what was raised inside or outside of the Canadian taxpaying

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